Trust in International Relations by Hiski Haukkala Carina van de Wetering Johanna Vuorelma

Author:Hiski Haukkala,Carina van de Wetering,Johanna Vuorelma
Language: eng
Format: epub
Publisher: Taylor & Francis (CAM)

Rational trust and the origins of multilateral organisations

This chapter situates itself against the dominant position in the literature to suggest that trust based on rational calculation was primarily important in the ASEAN case. Rathbun argues that multilateralism is the expression of trust, and that trust is required to begin the process of coming together to build institutions, rather than distrust characterised in the rationalist literature (2012, 2, 5). He further argues for a basis in generalised trust as rational (or strategic) trust is too limited to create multilateral institutions with qualitative and quantitative multilateralism (2012, 2, 4). In this, generalised trust is a moralistic form of trust, and it is dispositional making it a quality of the trustor, grounded in particular cooperative social orientations (2012, 30–33). What is problematic, however, is that Rathbun seems to suggest that trust is static, when arguing that rational trust cannot evolve and account for diffuse reciprocity over time, and that it is derived from experience and incentives to sustain trust (2012, 17, 18).

Instead, this chapter argues that rational trust was the necessary condition for ASEAN’s creation. As this will be demonstrated, the chapter will briefly offer an overview of rational trust being adopted, before moving onto demonstrating how this will be measured. Rational trust incorporates what is known as strategic, rational, reasoned, or encapsulated trust (Hollis 1998; Hardin 2002; Mollering 2006; Rathbun 2011, 349). Within this conception, relationships depend on interest-based calculations concerning pay-offs and deterrence, akin to the rational choice theory (Lewicki and Bunker 1995, 145; Mollering 2006, 32; Ruzicka and Wheeler 2010, 73). A rational assessment of the other would be the primary input to the assessment of trust. The benefits derived from either staying in the relationship or cheating, as well as the costs of both, are considered similar to a ‘market oriented economic calculation’ (Lewicki and Bunker 1995, 145). Kydd represents this conception of trust within International Relations. Kydd focuses on prediction and estimates in assessing whether states have ‘assurance game’ preferences, and are therefore trustworthy (Kydd 2005; Haukkala et al. 2015; Ruzicka and Keating 2015, 7).

This is also observed outside of International Relations with for example Hardin arguing that there are two elements crucial to the rationalist account; incentives of the trustee to honour the trust, and knowledge to justify the trustor’s trust (Hardin 2002; Rathbun 2011, 350; Ruzicka and Keating 2015, 5). Crucially, for Hardin trust emerges when individuals have what he terms encapsulated interest – self-interest in reciprocating cooperation and a perception that the trustee has similar interests (2006). However, where the chapter’s model departs from these accounts is that it does not agree with the implication that agents are rationalist, as often argued by scholars who focus on this conceptualisation of trust (Rathbun 2011, 351).

Instead, dispositions and emotions of individuals are important, but at this stage rationality and calculation dominate as experiences of the other are limited. It would be expected that rational trust is extremely relative and limited, as any sense of obligation is limited,

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